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Abstract
Interactive realizability is a computational semantics of classical Arithmetic. It is based on
interactive learning and was originally designed to interpret excluded middle and Skolem axioms
for simple existential formulas. A realizer represents a proof/construction depending on some
state, which is an approximation of some Skolem functions. The realizer interacts with the
environment, which may provide a counter-proof, a counterexample invalidating the current
construction of the realizer. But the realizer is always able to turn such a negative outcome
into a positive information, which consists in some new piece of knowledge learned about the
mentioned Skolem functions. The aim of this work is to extend Interactive realizability to a
system which includes classical first-order Peano Arithmetic with Skolem axioms. For witness
extraction, the learning capabilities of realizers will be exploited according to the paradigm of
learning by levels. In particular, realizers of atomic formulas will be update procedures in the
sense of Avigad and thus will be understood as stratified-learning algorithms.
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1 Introduction
Do classical proofs have some constructive content? If yes, what is a construction in classical
logic? On a first thought one is inclined to think that these questions cannot have any
interesting answers in terms of effective computer programs.
Surely, a classical proof is a mental construction, for it is a succession of constructive
steps interleaved with some ineffective considerations, which however appear to have a clear
mental constructive significance. Indeed, when we use the excluded middle, we can clearly
picture ourselves ideally deciding whether in a situation something holds or does not. When
we use an axiom of comprehension, we employ a definite law in order to construct in our
minds a perfectly determined collection of elements. When we use the axiom of choice, we
may imagine ourselves to make arbitrary choices as long as it is needed.
Even if a classical proof seems a legitimate mental construction, it is still a long way to
yield some effective computer program. Nevertheless, from the beginning of proof theory
many results have been obtained in that direction, which clearly showed that classical proofs
have a constructive content. Of course, we refer to the seminal results obtained by Hilbert’s
epsilon substitution method (see e.g [18]) and Gentzen’s cut elimination [14]. Then, several
other techniques have been introduced: among them, Gödel’s double negation translation
followed either by the Gödel functional interpretation [13] or Kreisel’s modified realizability
[16] and Friedman’s translation [12]; finally, Curry-Howard correspondence (see e.g. [19]).
The Curry-Howard correspondence, first introduced for intuitionistic logic and finally
extended to higher-order classical logic [17], clearly shows that a classical proof not only is a
mental construction but has the very same syntactic structure of a program. In other words,
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a proof is an effective program. Thus the problem of explaining what is a construction in
classical logic acquires a perfectly sound mathematical sense.
Though all these constructive interpretations may seem very different from each other, a
deeper study shows that they are all based on the same concept: learning. As suggestively
showed by Coquand [11], a classical proof yields a learning strategy in some class of games
in which players can erase their moves and backtrack to earlier positions of the game.
Now, the most important problem to solve in order to understand and implement efficiently
the constructive content of classical proofs, is to provide an accurate description of the nature
and the structure of the knowledge that a program extracted from a classical proof gathers
during its execution. Only after a precise description of learning has been completed, one can
think of how to build efficient programs. This remains a complex task, but it is of central
importance to start by defining a semantics for classical proofs explicitly based on learning.
In order to provide answers to those issues, Interactive realizability [1, 4, 6] has been
developed: it is a realizability semantics based on states of knowledge and learning, designed
for a system of Heyting Arithmetic with excluded middle and choice principles (Skolem
axioms) restricted to Σ01-formulas. In hindsight, it can be seen as modern evolution of the
epsilon substitution method, refined and rebuilt around the Curry-Howard correspondence for
classical logic and game semantics. The aim of this paper is to take the theory of Interactive
realizability to the next level: we extend it in order to interpret a full classical system,
which includes first-order Peano Arithmetic with Skolem axioms, that is, excluded middle,
comprehension and choice over all first-order formulas.
The theory of Interactive realizability makes precise the intuitive considerations that
we have made above. In particular, it explains how to interpret a classical proof, how to
pass from the ideal mental construction it represents to a concrete effective construction (a
program). The main concepts are indeed the following:
TClass and mental constructions. An interactive realizer is in the first place a term of
TClass, a version of Gödel’s system T enriched with Skolem function symbols for every
arithmetical formulas. The terms of TClass represent the mental constructions that one
can obtain directly and intuitively from a classical proof.
States of Knowledge as Approximations. Terms of TClass are ineffective and, let to
themselves, useless. Therefore, interactive realizers are always computed with respect to
states, i.e. approximations of the Skolem functions they contain and thus effectiveness is
recovered.
Learning. Since finite approximations may be inadequate, results of computations may be
wrong. But an interactive realizer is also a self-correcting program, able to spot incorrect
values of the approximations used during computations and to correct them with right
values. The new values are learned, remarkably, by realizers of classical principles and all
the oracle values needed during each particular computation are acquired through learning
processes. Here is the fundamental insight: classical principles may be computationally
interpreted as learning devices.
All these ideas work very smoothly for the most simple instance of the excluded middle
EM1 := ∀xN. ∃yNP (x, y) ∨ ∀yN¬P (x, y) (P computable atomic predicate)
A realizer of this principle uses some approximation s of a Skolem function Φ for P in
order to decide which side of EM1 is true. If for some particular n, P (n, s(n)) holds, then
the realizer has a witness for the left side; otherwise, it declares the right side to be true.
However, if the environment asks the realizer for a construction of ¬P (n,m) and actually
m is a counterexample to its belief (i.e. P (n,m) is true), then the realizer corrects the
F. Aschieri 33
approximation s as to output m on input n. We observe that this correction is sound on
absolute grounds: m is a correct value for Φ on argument n.
In the case of a general instance of the excluded middle
EM := ∀xN. ∃yNA(x, y) ∨ ∀yN¬A(x, y) (A first-order formula)
one stumbles across a serious problem: even if one has an approximation s of a Skolem
function Φ for A(x, y), how to compute whether A(n, s(n)) holds? In general, one cannot know
for sure the truth value of a complex formula. A realizer thus may assume that s(n) is not a
witness and declare the right side to be true. However, a problem remains because learning
is going to be by counterexamples: how to test whether an m given by a computational
environment is such that A(n,m) is true? The solution is to “compute” the truth value of
A(n,m) by using the approximations of the Skolem functions for the sub-formulas of A: for
eliminating quantifiers, it suffices to use the equivalences ∃y B(x, y) ≡ B(x,ψ(x)), where ψ
is a Skolem function for B. Since these approximations refer to Skolem functions for formulas
of lower logical complexity than that of A, a realizer can determine on relatively firm grounds
whether m is a correct value for Φ on argument n.
An important concept that we shall introduce is therefore that of truth value of a formula
in a state and we shall study how it relates to realizability. Another novelty is that the
self-corrections of realizers will not be absolute, but relative, and learning will be by levels.
By this we mean that whenever a realizer gains some knowledge concerning a Skolem function
for some formula, it may falsify a knowledge about another Skolem function for a formula of
higher complexity than the first. In this case, one is forced to remove the falsified knowledge
and all its consequences of greater level from the current state. The termination of this
add-and-remove process is not at all evident, yet it may be proved by well-established
techniques: we shall be able to see that a realizer of an atomic formula is an update procedure
in the sense of Avigad [8], and that will be enough for witness extraction. As in [4], one can
see Interactive realizability as new use of Friedman’s translation and modified realizability,
that allows to extract update procedures from classical proofs without transforming them in
quantifier-free form, as in the epsilon substitution method or Herbrand analysis.
Plan of the Paper. In section §2 we introduce the term calculus TClass in which Interactive,
learning-based realizers are written, namely an extension of Gödel’s system T plus Skolem
function symbols for a denumerable collection of Skolem functions. In section §3, we extend
Interactive realizability, as described in [1, 4], to HAω+EM+SK, an arithmetical system with
functional variables which includes first-order classical Peano Arithmetic and Skolem axioms.
In section §4 we show how to perform witness extraction with Interactive realizability. Full
proofs of all results of this paper may be found in [7].
Acknowledgments. We thank Stefano Berardi for valuable comments and suggestions.
2 The Term Calculus TClass
In this section we follow the approach of [1, 4] and describe the typed lambda calculi T and
TClass in which interactive realizers are written. T is an extension of Gödel’s system T (see
Girard [15]) with some syntactic sugar. The basic objects of T are numerals, booleans, and
its basic computational constructs are primitive recursion at all types, if-then-else, pairs,
as in Gödel’s T. T also includes as basic objects finite partial functions over N and simple
primitive recursive operations over them. TClass is obtained from T by adding on top of it a
collection of Skolem function symbols Φ0,Φ1,Φ2 . . . , of type N→ N, one for each arithmetical
formula. The symbols are inert from the computational point of view and realizers are always
computed with respect to some approximation of the Skolem maps represented by Φ0,Φ1, . . ..
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2.1 Updates
In order to define T , we start by introducing the concept of “update”, which is nothing but
a finite function over N (i.e. a map over N with finite domain). Realizers of atomic formulas
will return these finite functions, or “updates”, as new pieces of information that they have
learned about the Skolem function Φ0,Φ1, . . .. Skolem functions, in turn, are used as “oracles”
during computations in the system TClass. Updates are new associations input-output that are
intended to correct, and in this sense, to update, wrong oracle values used in a computation.
I Definition 1 (Updates and Consistent Union). We define:
1. An update set U , shortly an update, is a finite set of triples of natural numbers representing
a finite function from N2 to N.
2. Two triples (a, n,m) and (a′, n′,m′) of numbers are consistent if a = a′ and n = n′ implies
m = m′. Two updates U1, U2 are consistent if U1 ∪ U2 is an update.
3. U is the set of all updates.
4. The consistent union U1 U U2 of U1, U2 ∈ U is U1 ∪ U2 minus all triples of U2 which are
inconsistent with some triple of U1.
The consistent union U1 U U2 is an non-commutative operation: whenever a triple of U1
and a triple of U2 are inconsistent, we arbitrarily keep the triple of U1 and we reject the
triple of U2, therefore for some U1, U2 we have U1 U U2 6= U2 U U1. The operator U represents
a way of selecting a consistent subset of U1 ∪ U2, such that U1UU2 = ∅ =⇒ U1 = U2 = ∅.
Any operator U with that property would produce an alternative Realizability Semantics.
2.2 The System T
T is formally described in figure 1. Terms of the form ifA t1 t2 t3 will be written in the more
legible form if t1 then t2 else t3. A numeral is a term of the form S(. . .S(0) . . .). For every
update U ∈ U, there is in T a constant U : U, where U is a new base type representing U.
We write ∅ for ∅. In T , there are four operations involving updates (see figure 1):
1. The first operation is denoted by the constant min : U → N. min takes as argument an
update constant U ; it returns the minimum numeral a such that (a, n,m) ∈ U for some
n,m ∈ N, if any exists; it returns 0 otherwise.
2. The second operation is denoted by the constant get : U→ N3 → N. get takes as arguments
an update constant U and three numerals a, n, l; it returns m if (a, n,m) ∈ U for some
m ∈ N (i.e. if (a, n) belongs to the domain of the partial function U); it returns l otherwise.
3. The third operation is denoted by the constant mkupd : N3 → U. mkupd takes as
arguments three numerals a, n,m and transforms them into (the constant coding in T )
the update {(a, n,m)}.
4. The fourth operation is denoted by the constant uniondbl : U2 → U. uniondbl takes as arguments two
update constants and returns the update constant denoting their consistent union.
We observe that the constants min, get,mkupd are just syntactic sugar and may be avoided
by coding finite partial functions into natural numbers. System T may thus be coded in
Gödel’s T. As proved in [1, 4], T is strongly normalizing, has the uniqueness-of-normal-form
property and the following normal form theorem also holds.
I Lemma 2 (Normal Form Property for T + C +R). Assume that R is a functional set of
reduction rules for C. Assume A is either an atomic type or a product type. Then any closed
normal term t ∈ T of type A is: a numeral n : N, or a boolean True, False : Bool, or an
update constant U : U, or a constant of type A, or a pair 〈u, v〉 : B × C.
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Types
σ, τ ::= N | Bool | U | σ → τ | σ × τ
Constants
c ::= Rτ | ifτ | 0 | S | True | False | min | get | mkupd | uniondbl | U (∀U ∈ U)
Terms
t, u ::= c | xτ | tu | λxτu | 〈t, u〉 | pi0u | pi1u
Typing Rules for Variables and Constants
xτ : τ | 0 : N | S : N→ N | True : Bool | False : Bool | U : U (for every U ∈ U) | uniondbl : U→ U→ U
| min : U→ N | get : U→ N→ N→ N→ N | mkupd : N→ N→ N→ U
| ifτ : Bool→ τ → τ → τ | Rτ : τ → (N→ (τ → τ))→ N→ τ
Typing Rules for Composed Terms
t : σ → τ u : σ
tu : τ
u : τ
λxσu : σ → τ
u : σ t : τ
〈u, t〉 : σ × τ
u : τ0 × τ1
i ∈ {0, 1}piiu : τi
Reduction Rules All the usual reduction rules for simply typed lambda calculus (see Girard [15]) plus the
rules for recursion, if-then-else and projections
Rτuv0 7→ u RτuvS(t) 7→ vt(Rτuvt) ifτ Trueu v 7→ u ifτ Falseu v 7→ v pii〈u0, u1〉 7→ ui, i = 0, 1
plus the following ones, assuming a, n,m, l be numerals:
minU 7→
{
a if ∃m,n. (a, n,m) ∈ U ∧ ∀(b, i, j) ∈ U. a ≤ b
0 otherwise U1 uniondbl U2 7→ U1 U U2
getU an l 7→
{
m if ∃m. (a, n,m) ∈ U
l otherwise mkupd anm 7→ {(a, n,m)}
Figure 1 The extension T of Gödel’s system T.
2.3 The System TClass
We now define a classical extension of T , that we call TClass, with a Skolem function symbol for
each arithmetical formula. The elements of TClass will represent (non-computable) realizers.
I Definition 3 (The System TClass). Define TClass = T + SC, where SC is a countable set of
Skolem function constants, each one of type N → N. We assume to have an enumeration
Φ0,Φ1,Φ2, . . . of all the constants in SC (while generic elements of SC will be denoted with
letters Φ,Ψ,σ, τ, . . .).
Every Φ ∈ SC represents a Skolem function for some arithmetical formula ∃yNA(x, y),
taking as argument a number x and returning some y such that A(x, y) is true if any exists,
and an arbitrary value otherwise. In general, there is no set of computable reduction rules for
the constants in SC, and therefore no set of computable reduction rules for TClass. Each (in
general, non-computable) term t ∈ TClass is associated to a set {t[s] |s ∈ T , s : N2 → N} ⊆ T
of computable terms we call its “approximations”, one for each term s : N2 → N of T ,
which is thought as a sequence s0, s1, s2, . . . of computable approximations of the oracles
Φ0,Φ1,Φ2, . . . (with si we denote s(i)).
I Definition 4 (Approximation at state s). We define:
1. A state is a closed term of type N2 → N of T . If i is a numeral, with si we denote s(i).
2. Assume t ∈ TClass and s is a state. The “approximation of t at state s” is the term t[s] of
T obtained from t by replacing each constant Φi with si.
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3 An Interactive Learning-Based Notion of Realizability for
HAω + EM+ SK
In this section we introduce a learning-based notion of realizability for HAω + EM + SK,
Heyting Arithmetic in all finite types (see e.g. Troelstra [20]) plus Excluded Middle and
Skolem axiom schemes for all arithmetical formulas. Then we prove our main Theorem, the
Adequacy Theorem: “if a closed formula is provable in HAω+EM+SK, then it is realizable”.
We first define the formal system HAω + EM + SK. We represent atomic predicates of
HAω+EM+SK with closed terms of TClass of type Bool. Terms of HAω+EM+SK are elements of
TClass and thus may include the function symbols in SC. We assume having in Gödel’s T some
terms ⇒Bool: Bool → Bool → Bool,¬Bool : Bool → Bool,∨Bool : Bool → Bool → Bool . . .,
implementing boolean connectives. As usual, we shall use infix notation: for example, we
write t1 ⇒Bool t2 in place of ⇒Bool t1t2 and similarly for the other connectives.
3.1 Language of HAω + EM+ SK
We now define the language of the arithmetical theory HAω + EM + SK.
I Definition 5 (Language of HAω + EM + SK). The language LClass of HAω + EM + SK is
defined as follows.
1. The terms of LClass are all t ∈ TClass.
2. The atomic formulas of LClass are all Q ∈ TClass such that Q : Bool.
3. The formulas of LClass are built from atomic formulas of LClass by the connectives ∨, ∧,
→, r , ∀, ∃ as usual, with quantifiers possibly ranging over variables xτ , yτ , zτ , . . . of
arbitrary finite type τ of TClass.
4. A formula of LClass is said arithmetical if it does not contain constants in SC and all its
quantifiers range over the type N, i.e. it has one of the following forms: ∀xNA, ∃xNA,
A ∨B, A ∧B, A→ B, ArB, P , with A,B arithmetical and P atomic formula of T .
We denote with ⊥ the atomic formula False and with ¬A the formula A → ⊥. The
connective r is the dual of implication as in bi-intuitionistic logic and means “A and the
opposite of B”. If F is a formula of LClass in the free variables xτ11 , . . . , xτnn and t1 : τ1, . . . , tn :
τn are terms of LClass, with F (t1, . . . , tn) we shall denote the formula F [t1/x1, . . . , tn/xn].
Sequences of variable xN1, . . . , xNk will be written as ~x. We denote with 〈~x〉 a term of T in the
free numeric variables ~x representing a injection of Nk into N. Moreover, for every sequence
of numerals ~n = n1, . . . , nk, we define 〈~n〉 := 〈~x〉[~n/~x] and assume that the function ~n 7→ 〈~n〉
is a bijection.
The Excluded Middle axiom scheme EM is defined as the set of all formulas of the form:
∀~x N. A(~x) ∨ ¬A(~x)
where A is an arithmetical formula.
The Skolem axiom scheme SK contains for each arithmetical formula A(~x, y) an axiom:
∀~x N. ∃yNA(~x, y)→ A(~x,Φ〈~x〉)
with Φ ∈ SC. We assume that for every Φ ∈ SC there is in SK one and only one formula in
which Φ occurs. Such unique formula A is said to be the formula associated to Φ and Φ will
be sometimes written as ΦA. If s is a state and Φi = ΦA, with sA we denote si and with
mkupdAu t we denote mkupd i u t. With lev(Φ) we denote the number measuring the logical
complexity of the formula A associated to Φ, i.e. the number of quantifiers occurring in A.
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If s, s′ are two states and n a numeral, we write s ≡ s′ lev(n) if for every A of complexity
strictly less than n, one has sA(m) = s′A(m) for all numerals m.
For each formula F of LClass, its involutive negation F⊥ is defined by induction on F .
First, we say that an atomic formula P is positive if it is of the form ¬Bool . . .¬BoolQ, Q is
not of the form ¬BoolR, and the number of ¬Bool in front of Q is even. Then we define:
(¬BoolP )⊥ = P (if P positive) P⊥ = ¬BoolP (if P positive)
(A ∧B)⊥ = A⊥ ∨B⊥ (A ∨B)⊥ = A⊥ ∧B⊥
(A→ B)⊥ = ArB (ArB)⊥ = A→ B
(∀xτA)⊥ = ∃xτA⊥ (∃xτA)⊥ = ∀xτA⊥
As usual, one has (F⊥)⊥ = F .
3.2 Truth Value of a Formula in a State
The axioms of the system HAω + EM + SK give a great computational power to the system
TClass: one can “compute” by a term χF of TClass the truth value of any arithmetical formula
F . When one effectively evaluates χF in a particular state s, we say that one computes the
truth value of a formula F in a state s.
I Definition 6 (Truth Value of a Formula F in a State s). For every arithmetical formula
F (~x) of LClass we define, by induction on F , a term χF : Bool of system TClass, with the same
free variables of F :
χP = P, P atomic
χA∨B = χA ∨Bool χB χ∀yNA = χA[ΦA⊥〈~x〉/y] χArB = χA ∧Bool χB⊥
χA∧B = χA ∧Bool χB χ∃yNA = χA[ΦA〈~x〉/y] χA→B = χA ⇒Bool χB
We define F s := χF [s] and call it the truth value of F in the state s.
Intuitively, if F (~n) is a closed formula, our intended interpretation is:
1. χF (~n) is a term of TClass denoting, in any standard model of HAω + EM + SK, the truth
value of F (~n) .
2. F s(~n) is a term of T computing what would be the truth value of F (~n) in some standard
model of HAω + EM under the (possibly false) assumption that the interpretation Φi 7→ si
satisfies the axioms of SK.
We remark that thus F s(~n) is only a conditional truth value: if F s(~n) is not the correct truth
value of F (~n) – it may well happen – then the interpretation Φi 7→ si does not satisfy the
axioms of SK. This subtle point is what makes possible learning in Interactive realizability:
whenever a contradiction follows, realizers are able to effectively find counterexamples to the
assertion that the interpretation Φi 7→ si satisfies the axioms of SK. We also observe that
this way of computing the truth of a formula comes from the epsilon substitution method
(see Avigad [8], Mints et al. [18]).
The notion of truth in a state behaves as expected with respect to involutive negation.
I Proposition 7 (Truth in a State and Truth). For every arithmetical formula F (~x), state s
and sequence of numerals ~n, F s(~n) = False ⇐⇒ (F⊥)s(~n) = True
We now prove a fundamental fact: the truth of a formula F in a state s is determined
by the approximations that s gives to the Skolem functions of strictly lower level than the
logical complexity of F .
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I Proposition 8. Let F (~x) be any arithmetical formula of logical complexity m, ~n be a
sequence of numerals and s, s′ be states such that s ≡ s′ lev(m). Then F s(~n) = F s′(~n).
Every state s is considered as an approximation of the Skolem functions denoted by the
constants of SC: for each formula A, sA may be a correct approximation of ΦA on some
arguments, but wrong on other ones. More precisely, if Φi = ΦA, we are going to consider
the set of (i, 〈~n〉) such that As(~n, sA〈~n〉) = True as the real “domain” of s, representing the
set of arguments at which sA is surely a correct approximation of ΦA, in the sense that sA
returns an appropriate witness (but observe that the truth of A is approximated in s).
I Definition 9 (Sound Updates, Domains). We define:
1. Given an update U and a state s, we define doms(U) as the set of pairs of numerals (i, 〈~n〉)
such that A(~x, y) is the formula associated to Φi, (i, 〈~n〉,m) ∈ U and As(~n,m) = True.
U is said to be sound in the state s if (i, 〈~n〉,m) ∈ U implies (i, 〈~n〉) ∈ doms(U).
2. Similarly, if s is a state, we denote with dom(s) the set of pairs of numerals (i, 〈~n〉) such
that A(~x, y) is the formula associated to Φi, si〈~n〉 = m and As(~n,m) = True.
From now onwards, for every pair of terms t1, t2 of system T , we shall write t1 = t2 if they
are the same term modulo the equality rules corresponding to the reduction rules of system
T (equivalently, if they have the same normal form).
3.3 Interactive Realizability
For every formula A of LClass, we now define what type |A| a realizer of A must have.
I Definition 10 (Types for realizers). For each formula A of LClass we define a type |A| of
TClass by induction on A:
|P | = U, if P is atomic
|A ∧B| = |A| × |B| |∃xτA| = τ × |A| |ArB| = |A| × |B⊥|
|A ∨B| = Bool× (|A| × |B|) |∀xτA| = τ → |A| |A→ B| = |A| → |B|
Let now p0 := pi0 : σ0 × (σ1 × σ2) → σ0, p1 := pi0pi1 : σ0 × (σ1 × σ2) → σ1 and
p2 := pi1pi1 : σ0 × (σ1 × σ2)→ σ2 be the three canonical projections from σ0 × (σ1 × σ2). We
define the realizability relation t  F , where t ∈ TClass, F ∈ LClass and t : |F |.
I Definition 11 (Interactive Realizability). Assume s is a state, t is a closed term of TClass,
F ∈ LClass is a closed formula, and t : |F |. We define first the relation t s F by induction
and by cases according to the form of F :
1. t s Q for some atomic Q if and only if U = t[s] implies:
U is sound in s and doms(U) ∩ dom(s) = ∅
U = ∅ implies Q[s] = True
2. t s A ∧B if and only if pi0t s A and pi1t s B
3. t s A ∨B if and only if either p0t[s] = True and p1t s A, or p0t[s] = False and
p2t s B
4. t s A→ B if and only if for all u, if u s A, then tu s B
5. t s ArB if and only if pi0t s A and pi1t s B⊥
6. t s ∀xτA if and only if for all closed terms u : τ of T , tu s A[u/x]
7. t s ∃xτA if and only for some closed term u : τ of T , pi0t[s] = u and pi1t s A[u/x]
We define t  F if and only if for all states s of T , t s F .
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The ideas behind the definition of s in the case of HAω + EM + SK are those we already
explained in [1, 4, 6]. A realizer is a term t of TClass, possibly containing some non-computable
Skolem function of SC; if such a function was computable, t would be an intuitionistic realizer.
Since in general t is not computable, we calculate its approximation t[s] at state s. t is
an intelligent, self-correcting program, representing a proof/construction depending on the
state s. The realizer interacts with the environment, which may provide a counter-proof,
a counterexample invalidating the current construction of the realizer. But the realizer is
always able to turn such a negative outcome into a positive information, which consists in
some new piece of knowledge learned about some Skolem function Φi.
There are two concepts that are useful to understand the interaction of a realizer with
the environment: a realizer receives as input tests and produces as output predictions.
Predictions.
A realizer t of A ∨ B uses s to predict which one between A and B is realizable: if
pi0t[s] = True then A is realizable, and if pi0t[s] = False then B is realizable.
A realizer u of ∃xτA uses s to compute pi0u[s] = w and to predict that w is a witness
for ∃xτA (i.e. that A[w/x] is realizable).
Tests.
A realizer of a universal formula ∀xτA takes an object w as a challenge coming from
the environment to provide a construction of A[w/x], whose correctness will be tested
at the end of computation.
A realizer of A→ B takes a realizer of A as a challenge coming from the environment
to provide a construction of B, whose correctness will be tested at the end of the
computation.
A realizer of A ∧ B may be challenged to construct A as well as B, and again the
correctness of the construction will be tested at the end of computation.
A realizer of an atomic formula Q comes after a series of predictions and challenges
that have been provided to test the construction of a complex formula; the realizer
performs a final test and computes the formula Q in the state s as an experiment.
Since predictions of realizers need not be always correct, it is possible that a realized
atomic formula is actually false; we may have t s Q and Q[s] = False in T . If
Q, though predicted to be true, is instead false, then a counterexample has been
encountered; this means that the approximation s of the Skolem constants in SC is
still inadequate. In this case, t[s] 6= ∅ by definition of t s Q. That is to say: if the
construction of a realizer is wrong in a particular state, the realizer must learn from
its mistakes. The point is that after every learning, the actual state can be improved
with the information in U = t[s], since (i, 〈~n〉) ∈ U and A is associated to Φi imply
As(~n,m) = True and As(~n, si〈~n〉) = False.
The next proposition tells that realizability at state s respects the notion of equality of
TClass terms, when the latter is relativized to state s. That is, if two terms are equal at the
state s, then they realize the same formulas in the state s.
I Proposition 12 (Saturation). If t1[s] = t2[s] and u1[s] = u2[s], then t1 s B[u1/x] if and
only if t2 s B[u2/x].
3.4 Realizability of Classical Axioms
We are now going to show how to realize EM and SK. We first need to realize the ex-falso-
quodlibet axiom, for which a dummy term is enough.
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I Proposition 13 (Realizer of the Ex-Falso-Quodlibet Axiom). For every formula F (~x) of
LClass, there exists a closed term ⊥F of T such that ⊥F  ⊥ → F (~u), for every sequence of
closed terms ~u of TClass. In particular, ⊥F can be defined by induction on F as follows:
⊥P := λxU. x ⊥A→B := λxUλy|A|.⊥Bx
⊥A∧B := λxU.〈⊥Ax,⊥Bx〉 ⊥∃xτA := λxU〈0τ ,⊥Ax〉
⊥A∨B := λxU.〈False,⊥Ax,⊥Bx〉 ⊥∀xτA := λxUλyτ .⊥Ax
⊥ArB := λxU〈⊥Ax,⊥B⊥x〉
In Interactive realizability, as we shall see many times, realizers continually interact
with each other and game theory is a very useful tool to describe they behaviour (see [5]).
Interestingly, for realizing Skolem axioms and some instances of EM we are lead to consider
once again Tarski games. In these kind of games, there are two players and an arithmetical
formula on the board; the first player – usually called Eloise – tries to show that it is true,
while the second player – usually called Abelard – tries to show that the formula is false.
Thus, Eloise wins when true atomic formulas are on the board while Abelard wins with false
ones. In the case of formulas of the shape A ∨ B, ∃xNA, Eloise moves: in the first case by
choosing a side of the disjunction and in the second case by choosing a numeral as a witness
for the existential quantifier. In the case of formulas of the shape A ∧ B, ∀xNA, Abelard
moves: in the first case by choosing a side of the conjunction and in the second case by
choosing a numeral as a counterexample to the universal quantifier. In the case of formulas of
the shape A→ B, Abelard gives a winning strategy for A to Eloise and they play the game
for B. An Eloise strategy for A is represented by a term E of type |A|, while an Abelard
strategy for A is represented by a term A of type |A⊥|. Thus one may define the Tarski
game between strategies through a game operator ? (which indeed resembles the operator
? of symmetric lambda calculus [9]) that puts Eloise against Abelard. The result of the
game is thus E ?A and it is a term of type |⊥| = U. If E and A happens to be interactive
realizers, they represent self-correcting constructions. E and A challenge the construction of
each other, but who looses the interaction is always able to partially repair its construction,
i.e. to learn some information about some Skolem functions, which he puts in some update.
That is to say, E ?A realizes ⊥. Details follow.
I Proposition 14 (A Tarski Game Between Strategies). Let F be an arithmetical formula and
E : |F |, A : |F⊥| two terms of TClass. Define by induction and according to the shape of F a
term E ?A : |⊥| as follows:
(F = P, P atomic) E ?A := E uniondblA
(F = A→ B) E ?A := E (pi0A ) ? pi1A (F = ArB) E ?A := A (pi0E ) ? pi1E
(F = ∃yNA) E ?A := pi1E ?A (pi0E ) (F = ∀yNA) E ?A := E (pi0A ) ? pi1A
(F = A ∧B) E ?A := if p0A then pi0E ? p1A else pi1E ? p2A
(F = A ∨B) E ?A := if p0E then p1E ? pi0A else p2E ? pi1A
Then E s F ∧A s F⊥ =⇒ E ?A s ⊥.
We now establish two important links between the concept of truth in a state and the
concept of realizability in the same state.
The first result is that if a formula is true in a state s, then it is realizable in s. Intuitively,
F s = True means that the state s is both: i) powerful enough to compute witnesses for all
the subformulas of F and their negations which are supposed to be true if F is true; ii) sharp
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enough to not provide counterexamples invalidating some of those witnesses. Thus F can be
realized in the state s by a realizer TF which uses s to return the mentioned witnesses and
“waits” for possible counterexamples.
One could expect the converse to hold as well, namely that if F is realizable in s, then F
is true in s. This is not actually true, but “almost”. Indeed, the second result is that if F is
realizable in s and F s = False, one has disastrous consequences: ⊥ is realizable in s. In fact,
one can define a term FF transforming any realizer E of F in the state s in a realizer of ⊥ in
the same s, whenever F s = False. Indeed, if F s = False, then (F⊥)s = True by proposition
7; therefore A := TF⊥ realizes F⊥ in s. The state s is thus used to build a counterexample
A to F , which can be put against the realizer E of F in the term E ?A . This latter term
realizes ⊥ by proposition 14. Intuitively, if s is a strong enough approximation, A wins
and thus provides a counterexample to the fact that E is a construction of F ; since E , as
realizer, is a self-correcting program, it is able to extend the state s with new information:
this information realizes ⊥ in s. If instead s is not a good approximation, E wins and the
capabilities of A are used to improve the state s with an update realizing ⊥. Formally:
I Proposition 15 (Truth and Realizability in a State). Let F (~x) be an arithmetical formula.
There exist two terms TF (~x) and FF (~x) of TClass such that for all numerals ~n and state s
F s(~n) = True =⇒ TF (~n) s F (~n)
F s(~n) = False =⇒ FF (~n) s ¬F (~n)
In particular, TF and FF can be constructed by induction on F as follows:
TP := ∅, P atomic TA→B := λz|A|. if χA then TB else ⊥B(FAz)
TA∧B := 〈TA,TB〉 T∀yNA := λyN. if χA then TA else ⊥AmkupdA⊥ 〈~x〉 y
TA∨B := 〈χA,TA,TB〉 T∃yNA := 〈ΦA〈~x〉,TA[ΦA〈~x〉/y]〉
TArB := 〈TA,TB⊥〉 FF := λx|F |. x ?TF⊥
The most remarkable feature of our realizability semantics is the existence of a realizer
for any instance of EM, even if our language contains the positive symbols ∨,∃ which have
to be realized according to the Kreisel-style clauses of our definition of realizability.
I Proposition 16 (Realizer EA of EM). Let A(~x) be any arithmetical formula. Define
EA := λ~x N. 〈χA,TA,FA〉
Then EA  ∀~x N. A(~x) ∨ ¬A(~x).
We observe that the excluded middle can very well be defined as ∀~x N. A(~x) ∨ A⊥(~x). In
the case of Σ0n-formulas, one would get a simplified realizer of the form λ~x N. 〈χA,TA,TA⊥〉,
which does not use the game operator ? contained in FA. In the case of Σ01-formulas, one
recovers as a special case exactly the realizer of [1], where Interactive realizability was first
defined for HA + EM1 + SK1. We also observe that the realizer EA, when evaluated in any
state, uses two instructions: the read from the state operation for satisfying the constructive
clauses of realizability and the update of the state operation for dealing with counterexamples
to universal quantifiers. The operation of updating the state is used only to interpret classical
steps of proofs. We now show how to realize the Skolem axiom scheme SK.
I Proposition 17 (Realizer SA of SK). Let A(~x, y) be any arithmetical formula and Φ the
Skolem function constant associated to A. Define
SA := λ~x Nλz|∃y
NA|. if χ∃yNA then TA[Φ〈~x〉/y] else ⊥A(~x,Φ〈~x〉)(F∃yNAz)
Then SA  ∀~x N.∃yNA(~x, y)→ A(~x,Φ〈~x〉).
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3.5 Curry-Howard Correspondence for HAω + EM+ SK
In figure 2, we define a standard natural deduction system for HAω + EM + SK (see [19], for
example) together with a term assignment in the spirit of Curry-Howard correspondence for
classical logic. We replace purely universal axioms (i.e., Π01-axioms) with Post rules, which
Contexts With Γ we denote contexts of the form x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An, with x1, . . . , xn proof variables
and A1, . . . , An formulas of LClass.
Axioms Γ, x : A ` x|A| : A
Conjunction Γ ` u : A Γ ` t : BΓ ` 〈u, t〉 : A ∧B
Γ ` u : A ∧B
Γ ` pi0u : A
Γ ` u : A ∧B
Γ ` pi1u : B
Subtraction Γ ` u : A Γ ` t : B
⊥
Γ ` 〈u, t〉 : ArB
Γ ` u : ArB
Γ ` pi0u : A
Γ ` u : ArB
Γ ` pi1u : B⊥
Implication Γ ` u : A→ B Γ ` t : AΓ ` ut : B
Γ, x : A ` u : B
Γ ` λx|A|u : A→ B
Disjunction Intro. Γ ` u : AΓ ` 〈True, u, d|B|〉 : A ∨B
Γ ` u : A
Γ ` 〈False, d|A|, u〉 : A ∨B
Disjunction Elim. Γ ` u : A ∨B Γ, x : A ` w1 : C Γ, x : B ` w2 : CΓ ` if p0u then (λx|A|w1)(p1u) else (λx|B|w2)(p2u) : C
Universal Quantification Γ ` u : ∀α
τA
Γ ` ut : A[t/ατ ]
Γ ` u : A
Γ ` λατu : ∀ατA
where t is a term of LClass and αN does not occur free in any formula B occurring in Γ.
Existential Quantification Γ ` u : A[t/α
τ ]
Γ ` 〈t, u〉 : ∃ατ .A
Γ ` u : ∃ατ .A Γ, x : A ` t : C
Γ ` (λατλx|A| t)(pi0u)(pi1u) : C
where ατ is not free in C nor in any formula B occurring in Γ.
Induction Γ ` u : A(0) Γ ` v : ∀α
N.A(α)→ A(S(α))
Γ ` λαNRuvα : ∀αNA
Post Rules Γ ` u1 : A1 Γ ` u2 : A2 · · · Γ ` un : AnΓ ` u1 uniondbl u2 uniondbl · · · uniondbl un : A
where n > 0 and A1, A2, . . . , An, A are atomic formulas of LClass, and the rule is a Post rule for
equality, for a Peano axiom or for a classical propositional tautology or for booleans.
Post Rules with no Premises Γ ` ∅ : A
where A is an atomic formula of LClass and an axiom of equality or a classical propositional tautology.
EM Γ ` EA : ∀~x N. A(~x) ∨ ¬A(~x)
SK Γ ` SA : ∀~x N. ∃yNA(~x, y)→ A(~x,Φ〈~x〉)
Figure 2 Term Assignement Rules for HAω + EM + SK.
are inferences of the form
Γ ` A1 Γ ` A2 · · · Γ ` An
Γ ` A
where A1, . . . , An, A are atomic formulas of LClass such that for every substitution σ =
[t1/x1, . . . , tk/xk] of closed terms t1, . . . , tk of T and state s, A1σ[s] = . . . = Anσ[s] = True
implies Aσ[s] = True. Let now eq : N2 → Bool be a term of Gödel’s system T representing
equality between natural numbers. Among the Post rules, we have the Peano axioms and
axioms of equality
Γ ` eq S(x) S(y)
Γ ` eq x y
Γ ` eq 0 S(x)
Γ ` ⊥ Γ ` eq xx
Γ ` eqx y Γ ` eq y z
Γ ` eq x z
Γ ` A(x) Γ ` eqx y
Γ ` A(y)
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and for every A1, A2 such that A1 = A2 is an equation of Gödel’s system T (equivalently,
A1, A2 have the same normal form in T), we have the rule
Γ ` A1
Γ ` A2
We also add a Post rule for every classical propositional tautology A1 → . . . → An → A,
where for i = 1, . . . , n, Ai, A are atomic formulas obtained as combination of other atomic
formulas by the Gödel’s system T boolean connectives. Finally, we have a rule of case
reasoning for booleans. For any atomic formula P and any formula A[P ] we have:
Γ ` A[True] Γ ` A[False]
Γ ` A[P ]
If T is any type of T , we denote with dT a dummy term of type T , defined by dN = 0,
dBool = False, dU = ∅, dA→B = λzA.dB (with zA any variable of type A), dA×B = 〈dA, dB〉.
It can now be proved that every theorem of HAω + EM + SK is realizable (see [7]).
I Theorem 18. If A is a closed formula such that HAω + EM + SK ` t : A, then t  A.
4 Witness Extraction with Interactive Realizability
In this section, we turn our attention to the witness extraction problem for Π02-formulas.
Given a realizer t  ∀xN∃yNPxy, where P is an atomic recursive predicate, one is asked to
extract from t a non-trivial program taking as input a numeral n and yielding as output a
witness for the formula ∃yNPny (that is, a numeral m such that Pnm = True). In the case
of Interactive realizability, the problem of computing that witness can be reduced to finding
a “zero” for a suitable term u of type U, that is a state s such that u[s] = ∅. Indeed, given
any numeral n and state s, the following implications hold:
t  ∀xN∃yNPxy =⇒ t s ∀xN∃yNPxy =⇒ tn s ∃yNPny
=⇒ (pi0(tn)[s] = m ∧ pi1(tn) s Pnm) =⇒ (pi1(tn)[s] = ∅ =⇒ Pnm = True)
Therefore, if s is a zero of pi1(tn), then pi0(tn) is equal in the state s to some witness m of the
formula ∃yNPny. Intuitively, a zero for pi1(tn) represents a sufficient amount of information
to compute the required witness. Indeed, a zero for pi1(tn) always exists, because pi1(tn)
represents an update procedure (see [2, 8] for investigations and explanations of the concept).
I Definition 19 (Avigad’s Finite Update Procedures). A k + 1-ary typed update procedure
k ∈ N is a term U : (N→ N)k → U of T such that the following holds:
1. for all sequences f = f0, . . . , fk of closed type-N→ N terms of T
Uf 6= ∅ =⇒ Uf = {(i, n,m)} ∧ 0 ≤ i ≤ k
2. for all sequences f = f0, . . . , fk and g = g0, . . . , gk of closed type-N→ N terms of T and
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, if
Uf = {(i, n,m)}
for all j < i, fj = gj
gi(n) = m
then: Ug = {(i, h, l)} =⇒ h 6= n.
If U is a k + 1-ary update procedure, a zero for U is a sequence f = f0, . . . , fk of closed
type-N→ N terms of T such that Uf = ∅.
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Condition (2) describes learning by levels. If U is a k-ary update procedure and f is a
sequence of terms approximating the Skolem functions Φ0, . . . ,Φk (and we assume i ≤ j,
implies lev(Φi) ≤ lev(Φj)), there are two possibilities: either f is a fine approximation and
then Uf = ∅; or f is not and then Uf = {(i, n,m)}, for some numerals n,m: U says the
term fi should be updated as to output m on input n. Moreover, if Uf = (i, n,m), one
in a sense has learned at level i that Φi(n) = m on grounds of the values of fj , for j < i.
Condition (2) indicates that the information Φi(n) = m should be preserved, unless some
information in the lower levels changes.
For technical convenience we now add to T (and thus to system TClass), a constant
ch : U→ U which chooses exactly one element from every non-empty update and maps the
empty update to itself. Therefore, we assume to have in T conversion rules such that for
every non-empty update U
ch∅ 7→ ∅ chU 7→ {(i, n,m)}, for some (i, n,m) ∈ U
For simplicity, we are going to consider only proof-like terms of TClass: a term t is said to be
proof-like if: i) every occurrence in t of the constant mkupd is of the form mkupdi, where
i is some numeral, and Φi occurs in t; ii) no update constant different from ∅ occurs in t.
Indeed, that is the syntactic form of every interactive realizer extracted from some proof in
HAω + EM + SK.
I Proposition 20 (The Update Procedure Associated to an Atomic Realizer). Let Q be an
atomic formula of LClass and suppose t  Q, with t proof-like. Let without loss of generality
Φ0, . . . ,Φk the list of all Skolem function constants of t ordered by levels: if i ≤ j, then
lev(Φi) ≤ lev(Φj). Define
U := λfN→N0 . . . λfN→Nk . ch(t[f0/Φ0 . . . fk/Φk])
Then U is an update procedure.
From now on, the term U of proposition 20 will be called the (k + 1)-ary update procedure
associated to t. There is a standard way to compute a zero for any update procedure and
thus for the correspondent atomic realizer. In order to do that, if f = f0, . . . , fk is a sequence
of terms of type N→ N and U is an update constant, we define a term f ⊕ U which changes
the values of fi according to the triples (i, n,m) ∈ U , where i = minU , leaves fj for j < i
unchanged and changes every fj , with j > i, to be equal to the constant function λxN0.
I Definition 21 (Updates of Functions). For each numeral i, we define a term ⊕i : (N →
N)→ U→ (N→ N) as follows:
⊕i := λfN→NλuUλxN if minu > i then fx else if minu = i then (getu i x fx) else 0
We shall write t1⊕it2 in place of ⊕it1t2. If f = f0, . . . , fk is a sequence of terms of type
N→ N and u : U, we define f⊕u := f0⊕0u, . . . , fk⊕ku.
I Theorem 22 (Zero Theorem). Let Q be an atomic formula of LClass, suppose t is a proof-like
term such that t  Q and let U be the (k + 1)-ary update procedure associated to t. Let
s be any state. Define, by induction on n, a sequence {rn}n∈N of k + 1-ary sequences of
type-N→ N terms as follows:
r0 := s0, . . . , sk
rn+1 := rn⊕(Urn) (see definition 21)
Then, there exists a n such that t[(rn)0/Φ0 . . . (rn)k/Φk] = ∅.
F. Aschieri 45
Using the results of [3, 6], we are even able to extract a program belonging to system T .
I Theorem 23 (Program Extraction via Interactive Realizability). Let t be a term of TClass and
suppose that t  ∀xN∃yτPxy, with P : N→ τ → Bool closed term of system T . Then:
1. From t one can effectively define a recursive function f such that for every numeral n,
f(n) : τ is a term of system T such that Pn(f(n)) = True.
2. f can be represented in system T .
Remark. We observe that our algorithm for witness extraction is not the last word on the topic,
for it is not particularly optimized for real-world execution. However, thanks to our realizability
interpretation, we have now achieved a sharp understanding and control of the learning process which
is implicit in every computational interpretation of classical logic. This is crucial: the inefficiency of
the algorithms extracted from classical proofs is usually due to their inability to backtrack without
forgetting important information that they have acquired during the computation. It is already
evident that dramatically more efficient algorithm are possible, by managing in a more sophisticated
way the update of the states. For example, multiple updates of the states can be allowed at one
time and in the proof of the Zero theorem one does not need to “set to zero” every approximation
corresponding to a Skolem function of higher level of the first level which is corrected by an update.
For reasons of space, we leave these optimizations to future work.
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